Headlines:
- Cyprus presidency frames transport and energy as competitiveness and connectivity enablers
- Council draft agendas signal early sequencing of transport, energy and industrial files under the Cyprus presidency.
- ITRE presses Commission on ‘battery booster’ funding model as MEPs split over scale, trade defence and technology neutrality
- FuelsEurope says CO₂ car proposal leaves renewable fuels marginal after 2035
- Commission study maps modal shift potential for road freight under TEN-T rules
- Commission assessment finds limited impact from updated RED GHG values for biofuels and biomass
- UK transport committee chair backs AI deployment to improve roads and rail
- Commission backs €7.5m EGF support package after Audi Brussels closure
Cyprus presidency frames transport and energy as competitiveness and connectivity enablers
Cyprus set a broad “autonomy” frame for its Council presidency (Jan–Jun 2026), with transport, energy and connectivity positioned as enabling infrastructure for competitiveness, security and cohesion. For stakeholders, the practical implications are likely to sit in four clusters: funding and delivery of networks; maritime and ports as industrial policy; affordability and resilience in energy; and digital connectivity and critical infrastructure protection.
On transport, Cyprus signals a delivery agenda around completing missing links and removing bottlenecks, with an explicit focus on resilience, digitalisation and smart transport solutions. It flags air and sea connectivity as priorities, with particular attention to island and peripheral regions, and plans an Aviation Summit framed around connectivity, sustainability and competitiveness, alongside support for EU engagement at ICAO.
In legislative terms, the programme points to a push to conclude negotiations with the European Parliament on passenger rights and to improve multimodal connections between ports, airports and land networks, tying the file to integrated passenger transport and digital opportunities. Cyprus also intends to advance work on a forthcoming EU Ports Strategy through Council conclusions, emphasising connectivity, security and infrastructure aligned with decarbonisation objectives, alongside further implementation of the European Maritime Space and the role of European Transport Corridors.
Network funding and strategic corridors are placed squarely in the new long-term budget cycle. Cyprus plans a high-level TEN-T meeting focused on integration, security and investment needs, with attention to peripheral transport challenges and timely and effective completion of European Transport Corridors. It also aims to advance negotiations on Connecting Europe Facility III (2028–2034), signalling that transport infrastructure financing will be treated as part of the MFF package rather than a standalone technical file.
For road transport, Cyprus flags files with direct relevance to freight efficiency and costs, including continuation of trilogues on the Weights and Dimensions Directive, progress on a targeted Eurovignette amendment linked to CO₂ emissions classes for heavy-duty vehicles, and negotiations on the Roadworthiness Package. It also plans to convene the High-Level Group on Road Safety in the context of the EU road safety framework.
Maritime is treated explicitly as an industrial strategy. Cyprus plans work towards Council conclusions on an EU Industrial Maritime Strategy, framed around competitiveness and resilience of EU shipping, shipbuilding and maritime manufacturing, and links this to EU coordination at the IMO. It also references a “Lefkosia Declaration” initiative on seafarers’ education and women’s participation, positioning workforce and skills as part of the maritime transition agenda.
On energy, Cyprus places affordability and system resilience at the centre of its approach. It highlights energy security, diversification of routes and suppliers, and grid infrastructure and interconnections as prerequisites for the transition. The programme signals work on a European Grids package and a revision of security of supply architecture, alongside continued attention to storage and flexibility.
Connectivity is framed as both territorial cohesion and strategic autonomy. Cyprus links cross-regional connectivity for islands and peripheral regions to resilient digital networks, modern transport links and key energy corridors. It also intends to launch discussions on a Digital Networks Act and to advance cyber resilience and critical infrastructure protection.
On industrial strategy, the presidency ties transport and energy delivery to competitiveness and regulatory simplification, including omnibus initiatives and structured implementation of the Competitiveness Compass. The overall signal for green mobility stakeholders is a presidency focused on implementation, infrastructure financing and competitiveness framing, rather than new legislative ambition.
Council draft agendas signal early sequencing of transport, energy and industrial files under the Cyprus presidency.
The draft agendas for Council meetings in the first half of 2026, circulated before Christmas, give an early indication of how the Cyprus presidency intends to sequence transport, energy and industrial policy work, and where political attention is likely to concentrate. While the agendas are indicative rather than exhaustive, they point to a presidency focused on managing major structural files rather than launching new initiatives.
For transport, the key signal is timing. Transport ministers are scheduled to meet in early June, with the agenda explicitly listing military mobility, greening of corporate fleets, passenger rights, weights and dimensions, roadworthiness, Eurovignette, and the Connecting Europe Facility. The clustering of these files suggests an attempt to advance several long-running dossiers in parallel, with a strong implementation and enforcement angle rather than fresh legislative ambition. The inclusion of conclusions on a maritime industrial strategy and a ports strategy on the same agenda underlines the presidency’s intent to treat maritime transport as both a connectivity and an industrial policy file.
Energy is placed earlier in the calendar. Energy ministers meet in March and again at the end of June, with the European grids package positioned as the central legislative item. This sequencing indicates that grid infrastructure, permitting acceleration and security of supply, will be the backbone of the presidency’s energy work. Non-legislative exchanges on clean energy investment, energy efficiency financing, electrification and post-2030 decarbonisation suggest political space will be used to frame investment needs and system readiness, rather than to reopen targets.
Industrial policy is spread across several Council formations, most notably Competitiveness and General Affairs. The February Competitiveness Council is set to debate the European Competitiveness Fund and emergency plans for industrial resilience, explicitly linked to steel, automotive and chemical sectors. The same configuration is also scheduled to adopt conclusions on the evaluation of the European Agenda for Tourism 2030 and to hear a presentation on a forthcoming EU strategy for sustainable tourism, bringing mobility, connectivity and tourism demand into the industrial and competitiveness discussion. This reinforces the treatment of transport not only as infrastructure but as an enabling condition for regional development and economic activity.
This is reinforced in General Affairs by repeated agenda points on omnibus simplification packages and the MFF 2028–2034, signalling that industrial policy discussions will be tightly connected to budgetary architecture, regulatory burden and funding instruments rather than sector-specific regulation.
Taken together, the draft agendas point to a presidency that will prioritise pacing and file management. Transport and energy dossiers are sequenced to align with broader competitiveness, security and budget debates, while industrial and tourism policies are framed through financing, simplification and resilience. For green mobility stakeholders, this suggests that the first half of 2026 will be less about new policy direction and more about shaping outcomes on existing files, with timing and Council choreography playing a decisive role.
ITRE presses Commission on ‘battery booster’ funding model as MEPs split over scale, trade defence and technology neutrality
ITRE members used the first committee week of 2026 to press the Commission on whether its “battery booster” initiative is sized and designed to deliver investable European capacity, with the debate quickly splitting between concerns over global overcapacity and Chinese competition, and Commission arguments that the immediate gap is ramp up finance rather than technology development.
At an exchange of views on 15 January on the automotive package and the battery booster strategy, Commission director general Kerstin Jorna told MEPs the EU already has more than 200 GWh of installed cell capacity, with projects announced for more than 800 GWh. She presented the initiative as a six-pillar framework centred on investment support, resilient upstream value chains including raw materials, aligning investment with EU strategic interests, stimulating demand for EU-made batteries and recycling, accelerating research and innovation, and tighter coordination across Member States. Jorna said €1.5 billion from the Innovation Fund will be channelled through a battery booster facility in 2026, with a competitive call due by the end of January and an aim to support successful projects before the end of 2026.
The Commission positioned the measure as a bridge using resources under the current multiannual financial framework, arguing that the market failure sits in the period when production lines are adjusted, and yields are temporarily unusable, creating costs that private finance is unwilling to carry, even where developers claim an order book.
EPP coordinator Christian Ehler questioned whether the approach risks locking the EU into what he described as second-class technology at a time when China and others are moving towards next-generation chemistries, including solid-state. He also asked whether the Commission would consider protectionist trade measures for batteries. Jorna replied that technology development continues through Horizon, while the battery booster targets the investment gap between innovation and market deployment. On trade, she said openness has benefited the EU automotive sector, but accepted the relevance of trade measures, pointing to tariff action taken previously.
S&D member Matthias Ecke argued the initiative should be more substantial than a Commission communication, and pressed for a simpler, more mechanical subsidy design, including a per-kilowatt-hour support model combined with Member State co-funding. Commission officials rejected direct comparisons between public de-risking instruments and private investment volumes, saying the point is to target risk that markets are not pricing. They also linked future scale-up to the next multiannual financial framework, indicating that post-2026 measures would be addressed through the budget cycle.
Several interventions focused on technology neutrality and affordability. ECR member Ondřej Krutílek questioned whether the broader automotive package risks adding uncertainty and argued that CO₂ standards remain the core file, criticising the allocation of competence to the environment committee rather than a co-lead for industry. PfE members Paolo Borchia and Jana Nagyová attacked what they described as restrictive EU rules, and argued for parallel technology pathways rather than a battery-centric approach.
Concerns also emerged on circularity, safety and consumer confidence. Renew member Christophe Grudler pressed the Commission on how the booster would extend beyond 2026 and how the EU would build a credible battery recycling industry. EPP member Eszter Lakos raised environmental and labour risks linked to battery plant operation, including local oversight and community impacts, arguing that public funding should incentivise high standards. On second-hand markets, GUE member Dario Tamburrano asked whether battery quality information would be available to buyers and whether this could become mandatory. Commission officials agreed that trust and comparable, recognisable information on battery state of health is important, and said they are accelerating work to make such information available across the single market, including as cars move from corporate fleets into the secondary market.
MEPs also returned repeatedly to external dependency and the vertical value chain. Commission officials responded by citing wider single market instruments, including the Critical Raw Materials Act and the Net Zero Industry Act, and said future initiatives, including the forthcoming accelerator act, would continue to address value chain vulnerabilities rather than single products.
FuelsEurope says CO₂ car proposal leaves renewable fuels marginal after 2035
The European Commission’s mid-December proposal to revise the CO₂ emission standards for light-duty vehicles formally recognises a role for renewable fuels after 2035, but does so in a way that is unlikely to change compliance strategies or investment decisions, according to FuelsEurope.
The proposal acknowledges, for the first time, that biofuels and e-fuels can contribute to emissions reductions in new cars beyond 2035. However, their contribution is capped at 3% and confined to a compensation mechanism, which FuelsEurope argues renders the recognition largely symbolic.
The association highlights several omissions. The Commission has not introduced the promised category of vehicles running exclusively on CO₂-neutral fuels, despite earlier commitments linked to Regulation (EU) 2023/851. The regulatory framework continues to rely on a tailpipe-based definition of zero-emission vehicles, effectively limiting full-compliance pathways to battery-electric and hydrogen technologies.
FuelsEurope argues that this approach fails to restore technology neutrality and provides no credible long-term signal for investment in renewable fuel production. It also maintains that renewable fuels are not treated consistently with existing EU legislation, particularly the Renewable Energy Directive and emissions trading rules, where greenhouse gas savings from eligible fuels are already recognised.
Director General Liana Gouta warned that the legislative choices now facing the European Parliament and the Council will shape not only the competitiveness of the automotive sector, but also the future role of Europe’s refining industry and the security of fuel supply across transport modes.
FuelsEurope is calling on co-legislators to remove the 3% cap, introduce a zero-emission vehicle category for cars running exclusively on CO₂-neutral fuels after 2035, and align the CO₂ standards with existing EU renewable energy accounting. As negotiations begin, the central question will be whether the post-2035 framework remains narrowly defined or whether renewable fuels are allowed to play a material role in road transport decarbonisation.
